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APPELLANT'S ARGUMENT IN REPLY 
I. Neither Principles of Recoupment Nor Other Principles 
of Equity Create a Defense Against or Excuse 
Respondents1 Non-Performance of Their Obligations Under 
the Note, 
A. Respondents Were Not Entitled Under the Note to 
Offset Their Note Payments With Unliquidated 
Damage Claims Relating to the Post Office Roof. 
Respondents apparently accept the rule enunciated in 
Canton Hardware Co, v. Haller, 53 N.E.2d 509 (Ohio 1944) 
that acceleration is proper under the circumstances of this 
case if the respondents proved offsets against their note 
payments in an amount less than the accrued installments 
owing under the promissory note. As has been shown in 
Stacey's opening brief, if the damages awarded regarding the 
post office roof are not "offset" against past due note 
payments, then the offsets proven by respondents under the 
note are insufficient to prevent acceleration. Thus, the 
determinative issue is whether the judgment awarded to 
respondents relating to the post office roof should be 
"offset" against their past due installments thereby 
preventing acceleration or rather, as Stacey contends, 
recouped against the accelerated balance owing under the 
note. 
That issue is not determined by an analysis of the 
distinction between "recoupment" and "setoff" found at 
common lawf but by the agreement of the parties set forth in 
the note. The agreement is clear. The only condition under 
which respondents could avoid making their required payments 
to Stacey was by their offsetting those payments with 
expenses incurred by them which were reimbursable by 
Stacey. Plainly, unliquidated claims for damages did not 
constitute a basis for non-payment in that such claims were 
not supported by any reimbursable expenses and therefore did 
not fulfill the condition precedent required in the note for 
the assertion of an "offset." As has been stated, both 
Judge Roth and respondents1 own counsel recognized that such 
was the proper interpretation of the offset provision in the 
note.1 
•'-Respondents now attempt to recant their arguments 
made at trial concerning the meaning of the offset language 
in the note by arguing that those arguments were made "out 
of context." (Brief of Respondent, at p. 15, n. 11). To 
the contrary, those arguments were directly related to the 
interpretation of the offset provision. Mr. Waddoups, 
counsel for respondents, in regard to respondents1 
unliquidated damage claims argued to the Court as follows: 
Mr. Waddoups: The [roof] issue is not 
really an offset item. It is a damage claim, 
since no expenses have been incurred by the 
Golers, but we have reasonably proven that 
[Stacey] has failed to meet the contract 
obligation that we have been damaged in the 
fact that we have not got a water-tight roof 
. . . . (TR-472). . . . [L]et me say with 
respect to the sidewalk issue again, that is 
not really an offset item, but a breach of 
warranty, breach of contract item . . . . 
(TR-474). 
Whereupon the following exchanges occurred: 
Mr Anderson (counsel for Stacey): They 
(respondents) have admitted [the roof] is not 
- 2 -
As they did at trial, respondents attempt to pound a 
square peg through a round hole in arguing at length that 
section 17 of the letter agreement allows them the right to 
offset their unliquidated damage claims against past due 
installment payments. Section 17 of the letter agreement is 
expressly labeled "Idemnity" and requires Stacey to 
an offset item. It should not be offset 
against the note." (TR-476). 
The Court: Before ruling on the 
motions, I need a little bit of help. Mr. 
Waddoups, in your argument you suggested that 
your claim for damage to the roof was not in 
the form of an offset. I guess that took me 
by surprise. I have been considering all 
through the case that was your claim, that 
was part of the offset. I was looking at 
that issue the same as the others. 
Mr. Waddoups: I believe it is actually 
pled in the alternative as a damage item or 
as an offset. I had difficulty dealing with 
it, knowing how to deal with it as an offset 
item, since there has not been actually an 
outlay of cash. I think the most proper way 
is evidence of damage for breach of 
contract. Both ways were pleaded. 
The Court: The same reasoning then 
apply [sic] to the sidewalk, since there was 
no outlay of cash, there was no offset? 
(TR-477). 
Mr. Waddoups: I believe — 
The Court: [Y]ou agreed the sidewalk is 
not a setoff item, neither is the roof, for 
purposes of being offset against the note . . 
. . (TR-582, lines 21-23). 
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"indemnify, defend and hold [respondents] harmless" against 
a variety of expenses or damages sustained by respondents as 
a result of Stacey's failure to comply with the requirements 
of the letter agreement. 
In response to respondents' argument concerning section 
17 at the conclusion of trial, Judge Roth properly concluded 
that section 17 was intended to relate to Stacey's 
indemnification of respondents against expenses or damages 
incurred by them as a result of the actions of third 
parties; to the extent that respondents incurred actual 
expenses or sustained damages from such claims, they could 
offset their installment payments in those amounts, if they 
were properly reimbursable by Stacey. (See Transcript of 
Post-Trial Hearing of July 11, 1986 at p. 21). 
Aside from there never having been any third party 
claims against respondents to trigger section 17, it should 
be emphasized again that respondents simply incurred no 
expenses whatsoever regarding the roof which could be offset 
under the terms of the note against their installment 
payments. Again, as the district court concluded, 
"[b]ecause defendants had incurred no out of pocket expenses 
with respect to [the post office roof] prior to trial, no 
offset against the note arose under paragraph 17 of the 
Agreement and the Note." (Findings of Fact and Conclusions 
of Law at 1113(c)(4)). Therefore, respondents arguments 
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concerning section 17 only serve to confuse the issues and 
do not expand their right to offset to include claims for 
which they never incurred any reimbursable expenses. 
B. Equity Requires That Respondents Recoup Their Roof 
Damages Against the Accelerated Balance Owing, Rather Than 
Applying Those Damages So As To Prevent Acceleration. 
Stacey does not dispute that, as a matter of equity, 
respondents should be allowed to recoup the amount of their 
judgment relating to the post office roof against amounts 
owing by them to Stacey under the note. However, principles 
of equity similarly dictate that respondents1 right of 
recoupment be exercised against the accelerated principle 
balance owing, rather than against respondents1 defaulted 
note payments so as to prevent acceleration. 
A right of recoupment, being an equitable remedy, 
should not be exercised in such a way as to work an unfair 
prejudice to one of the parties. See, e.g., Freston v. Gulf 
Oil Co., 565 P.2d 787, 788 (Utah 1977) (in the absence of a 
showing of prejudice, equity requires a right of 
recoupment); W.J. Kroeger Co. v. Travelers Indemnity Co., 
541 P.2d 385, 388 (Az. 1975) (recoupment is an equitable 
doctrine); 20 Am. Jur. 2d, Counterclaim, Recoupment & Set-
off, §25 (1965) (equitable set off will not be allowed where 
it will work an injustice). 
Although respondents wish to dismiss the importance of 
the technical language of the note, that language provided 
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Stacey with important substantive protections against the 
respondents1 abuse of offset rights. Namely, that language 
created a built in control mechanism against the 
respondents1 arbitrary or groundless assertion of offset 
rights for items that did not truly require a remedy, or for 
items which were not Staceyfs responsibility. Under the 
note, respondents could not avoid their payment obligations 
by merely raising "concerns" about perceived deficiencies 
with the properties; rather, their right to offset was 
firmly rooted in commercial reality in that it required as 
condition precedents that (1) they incur an expense for 
which they were entitled to a reimbursement from Stacey and 
(2) they give Stacey notice of the amount of the claimed 
offset and the "specific reasons therefore." 
In light of the offset provision contained in the note 
to which respondents agreed, and upon which Stacey relied, 
respondents should now be estopped from attempting to 
enlarge the nature of their offset right to include claims 
for unliquidated damages. See 20 Am. Jur. 2d, supra at 250 
(a party may be estopped from, or waive its right to 
equitable setoff through its agreement). 
In addition to running contrary to the agreement of the 
parties to the detriment of Stacey, respondents can point to 
no counterveiling reason in equity why they should be 
entitled to apply their roof judgment against defaulted note 
payments, rather than recouping that judgment against the 
accelerated principal balance owing. Like other equitable 
remedies, the exercise of a right to recoupment is often 
justified on the grounds that the party seeking the 
recoupment had no adequate legal remedy. See, e.g.y 20 Am. 
Jur. 2d supra at 246. That clearly is not the case in this 
matter in that respondents at all times had the option of 
bringing a breach of warranty action against Stacey relating 
to its unliquidated claims for damages and in fact actually 
obtained an enforceable judgment relating to the roof 
pursuant to their counterclaims raised in this action. 
Additionally, the avoidance of "circuity of actions" in no 
way militates towards respondents' being allowed to recoup 
their judgment against past due installments, rather than 
against the accelerated balance owing. 
Finally, respondents' argument that Stacey should not 
in equity be entitled to demand "full performance under the 
Note while at the same time refusing to perform fully its 
obligations under the agreement" simply mischaracterizes the 
relief requested by Stacey. Plainly, Stacey is not seeking 
full payment of the promissory note. Stacey concedes that 
respondents proved their right to offset their note payments 
in the amount of $8,112.94; Stacey does not contend that 
respondents are entitled to recover the legitimate offsets 
proven by them. Additionally, Stacey concedes that 
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respondents are entitled to recoup their judgment relating 
to the post office roof against the accelerated amount owing 
under the note; Stacey does not seek to recover that amount 
from respondents.* 
Rather, Stacey now seeks to recover only that to which 
it proved it is entitled - the accelerated balance of the 
note remaining after the above-described adjustments. To 
deny Stacey that relief would be to repudiate entirely 
Staceyfs right of acceleration and to sanction respondents' 
continuous and blatant disregard of their own obligations 
under the note. 
C. There Are No Equitable Considerations Present in This 
Case Requiring That the Right of Acceleration be Established 
at a Time Other Than the Time of Trial. 
As argued in some detail in Staceyfs opening brief, the 
proper time to determine the right to acceleration is at 
trial. Judge Roth was troubled that this rule might create 
an injustice due to the "uncertainties and delays" 
associated with bringing a case to trial. That point is 
well taken. Howeverf Stacey submits that in the absence of 
a showing that it somehow procured a delay of the trial, or 
otherwise unfairly obtained an advantage due to that delay, 
Stacey does, however, question the appropriateness 
of the amounts awarded regarding the roof, as well as the 
offset allowed regarding the post office air conditioning 
unit. See Brief of Cross-Respondents. 
there is no reason not to determine the acceleration right 
according to the better rule, at the time of trial. 
In no way can it be said that Stacey procured a delay 
of the trial in order to build up defaulted installment 
payments. It should be remembered that Stacey was not 
receiving any payment under the note and it had no prospect 
of changing that scenario short of a trial. From Stacey1s 
perspective, there was no advantage whatsoever associated 
with delay; all of Staceyfs actions as shown in the record 
are consistent with seeking a prompt adjudication. For 
example, Stacey filed its Complaint on December 3, 1984, 
promptly conducted discovery and filed a Certification of 
Readiness for Trial on August 2, 1985. (R-232). 
Importantly, rather than Stacey procuring any delay, it was 
respondents who desired delay as evidenced by their 
Objection to Staceyfs Certification of Readiness for Trial 
filed on August 9, 1985. (R-242). 
Similarly, it was respondents who took advantage of the 
"delays associated with bringing the case to trial." This 
is perhaps no better illustrated than by respondents1 claims 
regarding the post office roof. Respondents sought to 
offset their payments regarding the estimated cost of 
replacing the roof in the spring of 1985 after the roof had 
sprung several leaks. See Exhibit D-7. However, Stacey 
responded to the problem and fixed the leaks (see Exhibit 
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D-7); as respondent Francine Wixen testified at her 
deposition in California on September 19f 1985, the roof 
remained "water tight" after those repairs. (Deposition of 
Francine Wixen at p. 85). 
This matter was originally set to be tried shortly 
after Wixen's deposition on October 24, 1985,2 rather than 
in May of 1986. If the trial had proceeded in October, 
respondents would have had scant evidence to support their 
claims that the roof needed replacing since Stacey had 
repaired the spring leaks and the roof was "water tight." 
Indeed, the roof expert ultimately utilized at trial by 
respondents had not even been retained by them prior to the 
October trial date (TR-262). 
However, the trial was delayed until May of 1986 to 
accommodate the Court and the respondents' schedule. In the 
spring of 1986, the roof sustained several acute leaks that 
were not quickly or easily repaired by Stacey, thereby 
bolstering significantly respondents' claim that the roof 
needed to be replaced. (See Exhibit D-7). A review of the 
post office maintenance log illustrates that the spring of 
1986 was by far the most leaky period for the roof. (See 
Exhibit D-7). Based on those spring leaks, respondents 
^The court's notification of the October 24, 1985 
trial setting is inexplicably absent from the record in this 
case. However, that trial setting cannot be disputed by 
respondents. 
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( 
retained a roof expert in April of 1986 who testified at the 
trial that the roof needed to be replaced. (TR-262). Thusf 
respondents can hardly claim that Stacey obtained an unfair 
advantage through the "uncertainties and delays" of bringing 
this case to trial. 
II. Stacey fs Right to Attorneys1 Fees and Costs Is Not 
Dependent Upon Its Prevailing on the Acceleration 
Issue. 
A. The Promissory Note Expressly Requires the Award 
of Attorneys1 Fees, Costs and Expenses Associated With 
Staceyfs Enforcement of Any of Its Rights Under the Note. 
The parties agree that Stacey1s right to recover its 
attorneys1 feesf costs and expenses is premised upon the 
agreement of the parties. That agreement expressly granted 
Stacey the following rights: (1) the right to repayment of 
the principal of $80f000 plus interest at 10.5%; (2) the 
right to receive installment payments of $731.39; and (3) 
the right to accelerate the principal balance owing if 
respondents breached the provisions of the note. As has 
been noted, Stacey was entitled to recover its fees, costs 
and expenses incurred "by or in connection with the 
enforcement or performance of any of [its] rights under the 
note." 
This lawsuit would have been an extraordinarily simple 
matter if it involved only Stacey1s presentation of its 
claims for acceleration. In such a case, Stacey would have 
been required only to prove respondents1 default, Stacey1s 
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right to acceleration and the accelerated amount owing. 
Instead, respondents transformed the case into a complicated 
"construction defects" case by asserting a myriad of 
complaints about the properties and their right to offset 
their note payments because of the problems. 
Regardless of its right to acceleration, Stacey was 
obviously forced to prepare defenses to each and every 
offset asserted by respondents if it hoped to receive any 
payment under the note. If Stacey's expenses associated 
with preparing those defenses were not incurred "by or in 
connection with the enforcement of [Stacey1s] rights" under 
the note, then one wonders for whose benefit and for what 
purpose those considerable expenses were incurred. 
Respondents attempt to ignore the practical realities 
of Staceyfs predicament by arguing myopically that (1) 
Stacey was seeking only to enforce its right of acceleration 
under the note; and (2) Stacey did not "enforce" any of its 
rights because respondents were never in default of their 
obligations. With all due respect, those arguments are 
hogwash. 
Stacey was plainly fighting for its life to receive 
some payment under the note, regardless of acceleration, as 
respondents had "offset" the note out of existence. 
Secondly, respondents were obviously in default of their 
obligations under the note. Even though Judge Roth 
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( 
concluded that, on equitable grounds, Stacey was not 
entitled to accelerate the note, he also concluded that 
respondents were only entitled to offset their installments 
in the amount of $8,112.943 — a full $74,966.37 less than 
the amount they attempted to offset. According to Judge 
Roth's adjudication, respondents were in default of their 
payment obligations as of June 1, 1985, the point in time 
when respondents1 $8,112.94 in legitimate offsets were 
exhausted. (See Exhibit E to Appellant Stacey Properties 
Opening Brief). 
Contrary to respondents1 argument, Stacey does not in 
any way contend that it is entitled to its fees and costs 
based upon a "prevailing party" theory. That theory has 
never been advanced by Stacey. Rather, Stacey*s entitlement 
to its fees and costs is based solely on the agreement of 
the parties. 
In direct opposition to respondents1 argument, Traynor 
v. Cushing, 688 P.2d 856 (Utah 1984) supports precisely 
Stacey1 s theory that it is entitled to a share of its 
JAgain, Judge Roth concluded and respondents agreed 
at trial that respondents were not properly entitled under 
the note to offset their payments with the unliquidated 
damage claims related to the post office roof. Even if this 
Court concludes that Judge Roth erred in this regard, Stacey 
nonetheless enforced its right to payment under the note in 
the amount of $67,249.83 plus interest, which was a 
substantial "enforcement of rights" under any standard. 
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attorneys fees and costs in proportion to its success. In 
Traynorf as respondents have notedf this Court recognized 
the impropriety of awarding attorneys fees based on a 
"prevailing party" theory without any reference to the 
agreement of the parties.4 That principle, however, does 
not mean, as respondents seem to argue, that the "prevailing 
party" cannot recover a portion of its fees and costs 
pursuant to an agreementf to the extent that it "prevailed" 
in vindicating some but not all of its rights. As this 
Court noted in Traynor: 
Each of these parties had rights under 
the agreement that were denied him by the 
other. Each was required to take legal 
action to enforce the agreement in one or 
more particulars. Each was successful on one 
or more points and unsuccessful on others. 
Each was therefore entitled to an award of 
attorneys* fees for successfully enforcing 
the agreement against the other. 
Id. at 858. 
The Traynor court went on to hold that the district 
court erred in failing to award fees and costs to the 
respective parties in proportion to their successful 
assertion of rights under the agreement. 
4Judge Roth engaged in precisely this error when he 
rejected Stacey1s right to fees without even hearing 
argument on the grounds that Stacey had not "prevailed" on 
the acceleration issue and was therefore not entitled to any 
of its fees and costs. (Findings of Fact and Conclusions of 
Law at 1120) . 
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Unlike the agreement in Traynory the attorneys' fees 
provision in the subject note does not provide for the award 
of fees and costs to either party enforcing its provisions, 
but only to Stacey.5 Therefore, Stacey alone is entitled to 
recover its fees and costs in proportion to its success in 
the manner described in Stacey's opening brief at pp. 30-31. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons set forth herein and in its opening 
brief, Stacey requests the relief requested in Stacey's 
opening brief. 
DATED: April 3 ^ , 1987. 
HANSEN & ANDERSON 
LA^yt^~^<>^~>> 
William P. Schwartz 
50 West Broadway, 6th Floor 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Attorneys for Appellant and 
Cross Respondent 
5While the Utah legislature has recently created a 
"reciprocal right" to fees and costs in actions involving a 
one-sided fee provision, that law by its terms only effects 
contracts executed after April 28, 1986 and is therefore 
inapplicable to this case. See Utah Code Ann. §78-27-56.5. 
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